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Abstract 
To address the surprising lack of research in the area of environmental migration, this 
paper reviews the existing literature and proposes two basic, two region, and general 
equilibrium models: a closed economy and a small open economy where migration 
occurs between regions. The models show that migration increases welfare in the rural 
region, characterized by a tragedy of the commons production function, but does not 
affect welfare in the region with a constant returns to scale production function. The 
paper also provides an economic definition of an environmental refugee in the respect 
of an environmental migrant. 
                                                   
* Junior researcher at Center for Economics and Development Studies (CEDS/LP3E), Padjadjaran 
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1.  Introduction 
The  Stern’s  Report  states  that  based  on  ‘conservative  estimates’  150-200  million 
people will be forced to migrate by 2050 as a result of environmental changes caused by 
climate  change.  This  is  a  staggering  figure  considering  that  the  Report  also  mentions, 
effectively in the same breath, the lack of research in the area of environmental migration. 
The existing literature tends to be qualitative in nature or to focus on the issues of 
politics  and  conflict,  or  why  environmental  shock  occurred  environmental  migration  is 
viewed as a humanitarian problem where scientific modeling informs the severity of the 
humanitarian crisis, rather than an economic one. 
While migration has been extensively analyzed econometrically, the analysis does not 
include environmental factors. Developed countries, however, will require confirmation of 
the estimates from the Stern Report, and will require a means of theoretical assessment of 
environmental  policy  changes,  so  much  so  that  they  may  require  coordination  between 
migration policy and environmental policy. 
A part of the issue of estimation concerns the definition of an ‘environmental refugee’ 
in  respect  of  an  ‘environmental  migrant’.  Even  though  these  terms  have  been  thrown 
around  in  academic  literature,  humanitarian  studies,  and  naturally  in  the  media, 
nonetheless their definitions remain elusive (Homer-Dixon, 1999). 
This structure of the paper is as follows. A review of the existing literature relevant to 
environmental migration is presented in section 2. Section 3 presents and discusses a series 
of  issues  raised  by  the  literature  review  which  are  pertinent  for  economic  modeling  of 
environmental migration. Sections 4 and 5 each present a general equilibrium model of 
environmental migration in which some of the characteristics from section 3 have been 
applied.  The  discussion  in  section  6  covers  general  points,  the  issues  important  when 
modeling  environment,  and  a  discussion  of  the  definition  of  environmental  refugees  in 




2. Literature Review 
This section presents an overview of literature relevant to environmental migration. It 
firstly reviews the findings from several papers on environmental migration and then looks 
at problematic of the definition of environmental refugees by presenting some qualitative 
articles.  Lastly,  this  paper  specifically  presents  the  existing  microeconomic  model  of 
environmental migration from Chichilnisky and di Matteo (1998) and the results of two 
relevant models on trans-boundary pollution. 
The Stern Report states that “climate change is likely to increase migratory pressures 
on developed countries significantly”, but also says that “the potential scale and effect are 
still very uncertain and require considerably more research.” It is important to note the 
emphasis on migratory pressures on developed countries, referring here to South-North 
migration while, Hatton and Williamson (2002) predict that the most significant migration 
in the future will be South-South migration. 
The  Stern  Report  points  out  two  reasons  why  climate  change  will  force  people  to 
migrate. Firstly due to income gap: real wage differentials are considered the main driver of 
migration. Secondly, due to environmental disasters: climate change will cause conditions 
to deteriorate such that large numbers of people will be “compelled to leave their home 
when resources drop below a critical threshold.” There are a number of aspects to notice 
about  this  claim.  Firstly,  the  reference  to  a  threshold  below  which  people  will  migrate; 
secondly, the decrease in resources will occur as a result of disasters caused by climate 
change; and, thirdly, that it is not clear whether the disaster is the direct cause of migration 
or that it has an indirect effect, e.g., because it causes a drop in production that will increase 
wage differentials. 
The Report says the exact number of people who will be displaced or forced to migrate 
will depend on the level of investment, planning and resources at a government’s disposal to 
defend these areas or provide access to public services and food aid. This number is derived 
mostly from Myers and Kent (1995) who’s saying that their estimates have not been tested 




longer gain a secure livelihood in their former homelands because of drought, soil erosion, 
desertification,  and  other  environmental  problems.  Nonetheless,  He  does  not  provide  a 
definition of “secure livelihood” hence this definition leaves much unclear. 
Bates  (2002)  attempts  to  clarify  the  previously  vague  definition  of  environmental 
refugees and environmental migrants, noting the academic literature has been sloppy in 
this area. A working definition is people “who migrate from their usual residence due to 
change in their ambient non-human environment.” The paper suggests three categories of 
environmental shock: disasters, expropriations, and deteriorations. 
Suhrke  (1995)  had  also  previously  pitched  into  the  debate  on  the  existence  of 
environmental migration, motivating in part Bates’ response. It is also difficult to extract a 
clear economic interpretation of Suhrke’s description of environmental migration since it 
alludes to a number of factors in environmental migration: environmental degradation was 
a  factor  in  outmigration  (emigration)  although  it  may  be  a  proxy  for  another  variable; 
demographic growth; various forms of degradation, change in relative wages in different 
regions, industrial sectors, or demographic groups; and, the type of interaction between the 
environment and population. This highlights the difficulty understanding how environment 
and migration are related, and how to model the relationship. 
Suhrke  continues  on  to  point  out  further  qualitative  factors  relating  migration  to 
environment, such as: a dynamic tragedy of the common1; the better opportunities in other 
regions; classic pull-push model2 or the uncertainty on reversibility of migration. 
Other interesting arguments on environmental migration are coming from the paper of 
Homer-Dixon (1999). In this paper He argues that environmental migration implies that 
the clear and dominant cause of migration is environmental disturbance which is seldom 
                                                   
1 Environmental degradation affects patterns of resource use such that as resources are extracted, yields 
decline, forcing farmers to exploit the land more intensively interpretation. 




the case since environmental factors only produce their effects in complex interaction with 
other aspects. Moreover, he also points out that environmental scarcity rarely manifests 
itself in a sharp and hurtful way that people are suddenly compelled to leave. 
The decision to migrate cannot be linearly modeled as a set of push and pull factors. 
He prefers to loosely define the reason for migration as the perceived difference in quality of 
life  in  the  sending  and  receiving  regions:  once  the  difference  reaches  a  certain  size,  an 
inhabitant migrates. Environmental scarcity causes environmental migration, but in such as 
way that there are complex interrelationships. Three reasons for this scarcity are: demand 
induced  scarcity  caused  by  rapid  population  growth  (direct  and  major  cause);  supply 
induced  scarcity,  e.g.,  cropland  degradation  and  depletion  (secondary);  and,  structural 
scarcity, e.g., land distribution. 
The  motivation  for  Chichilnisky  and  di  Matteo  (1998)  is  the  world  phenomena 
whereby the international market allows overconsumption in the North and overproduction 
in the South due to differing property rights regimes. The paper is also motivated by Myer’s 
(1993) result that migration is closely linked to environmental degradation. 
The  paper  poses  questions  about  how  migration  affects  the  exploitation  of  natural 
resources, how policies to check environmental degradation interact with migration flows, 
and how trade policies affect migration flows and the exploitation of natural resources. To 
this end, the paper presents a general equilibrium  model for analyzing some aspects of 
environment, trade and migration. Migration is linked to wage differentials and property 
rights regime of the environmental resource. 
Chichilnisky and di Matteo model gives the following results: if migration occurs due 
to wage differentials between countries (which the model assumes) then migration occurs 
when technologies are different; migration from the South decreases exploitation of the 
resource in the South, and increases welfare in the South, although it can decrease welfare 
in the North depending on exogenous parameters. Migration can lead to higher prices of the 
resource in the North, and better terms of trade in the South, reduces the wage differential 




South surprisingly increases the rate of extraction. These results do not hold if the labor 
elasticity of substitution is greater than one. Some results are key results derive from a 
previous paper by Chichilnisky (1995) which shows that when two countries have identical 
technology and preferences, a sufficient reason for them to engage in trade is the difference 
in property rights of the natural resource—the South has an apparent competitive advantage 
in  the  resource  intensive  good,  thus  the  South  exports  the  resource  intensive  good  and 
imports capital intensive good. 
While Chichilnisky’s model make an important contribution to microeconomic models 
of environmental migration, some criticisms are: it assumes free movement of labor which 
is empirically untrue, particularly as most developed countries have quotas on immigration; 
wage differentials are the only reason for migration while Hatton and Williamson (2002) 
provide  numerous  other  factors;  it  does  not  consider  that  a  receiving  government  can 
optimize immigration policy such as quotas in each period; the model makes certain strong 
assumptions  such  as  the  utility  function  has  an  elasticity  of  substitution  between  the 
consumption capital intensive good and leisure less than one, and the restriction on direct 
investment or induced technical change when local resource prices diverge as a result of 
migration. 
The model of Chichilnisky & di Matteo (1998) has the same logical structure as the 
Heckscher-Ohlin  model  that  highlights  the  connection  between  labor  migration  and 
exploitation of natural resources; however technologies differ between countries. Moreover 
this  paper  also  assumes  that  resource  is  extracted  using  labor  as  the  only  input  and 
according to a strictly concave production function. The South is assumed to have common 
property rights. This results in the amount of the resource supplied being an increasing 
function of the prices of the resource. The exact form of the supply curves depends on the 
property rights. 
There is no developed labor market in the extraction sector of the economy, labeled the 
subsistence sector; hence there is no market wage, rather an opportunity cost of labor which 




As  a  result,  the  quantity  of  the  resource  supplied,  increases  as  the  price  of 
environmental resource increases. It is assumed that the supply function of the resource is 
linear for simplicity with a parameter that explains supply is the resource is more sensitive 
to its price, representing the tragedy of the commons. 
Proposition 1 says that as the relative price of the resource decreases or the relative 
price  of  the  consumption  good  increases,  the  worker  in  the  subsistence  sector  of  the 
economy has to work more to secure a minimum level of subsistence, under the assumption 
that  the  utility  function  has  an  elasticity  of  substitution  between  leisure  and  capital 
intensive good less than one. Thus supply of environmental resource good is an increasing 
function of its price. This result is used in a number of later propositions. 
The paper argues that labor migrates because both real wages and price of the resource 
cannot  equalize  across  countries  simultaneously,  although  either  real  wages  or  resource 
price  can,  by  coincidence  equalize.  The  result  differs  from  the  Heckscher-Ohlin  model 
because technologies are different. The paper compares the terms of trade when real wages 
equalize to the terms of trade when resource prices equalize, and concludes that the two 
conditions cannot occur simultaneously, based on assumptions about the values of certain 
endogenous variables. 
Nonetheless, Chichilnisky and di Matteo do not quantify the relationship between the 
real  wage  differential  and  the  number  of  workers  migrating  because  it  is  a  complex 
phenomenon.  In  order  to  accommodate  migration  into  the  model,  the  model  is 
reinterpreted as a two phase model. 
One of the most important results from the paper is that migration increases welfare in 
the South while no conclusion is possible on the welfare changes in the North without more 
information about the exogenous variables. To obtain the result in the South, the paper 
argues, that since the consumption of capital intensive good is given in each country, an 




The result relies on the assumption that the resource intensive sector in the South is 
much more resource intensive than in the North. If this were also the case in the North, 
migration from the South would bring about a decrease in the terms of trade, and resource 
extraction would increase. 
Chichilnisky joins with a number of other papers concluding that partial equilibrium 
analysis of taxation can be misleading because the introduction of a unit tax on the use of 
the resource in the South, whose proceeds are used to increase demand for capital intensive 
good, reduces the terms of trade, the price of the resource, and increased extraction of the 
resource in the South. 
Hoel and Shapiro (2001) model trans-boundary pollution, perfectly mobile households 
and  governments  that  re-optimize  environmental  policy.  While  other  papers  have 
emphasized that optimal environmental policy in an international setting needs to be co-
operative, Hoel and Shapiro paper shows that the Nash equilibrium is the efficient solution 
of  the  policy  game  between  governments  when  households  are  perfectly  mobile.  Policy 
coordination may still be required if there are multiple Nash equilibria. 
Hoel and Shapiro use a framework where pollution taxes are collected in the local 
public sector, which treats newcomers and natives equally, so that newcomers can attain the 
same level of consumption and utility as old residents. The last two conditions imply that 
welfare is equalized between jurisdictions. 
The solution is obtained through a general theorem that states that the vector of policy 
choices between regions that maximize utility in all regions subject to feasibility constraints 
must also be a Nash equilibrium of the game described above. The interpretation is that 
because perfect social mobility equalizes utility between regions, no matter what policies are 
chosen at a regional level, all regions share a  common  interest in maximizing  common 
utility  level.  Alternatively,  under  perfect  mobility,  migration  is  like  a  rope,  holding  the 




Haavio (2003) models trans-boundary pollution, household mobility and governments 
that constantly re-optimize environmental policy non-cooperatively, based on models such 
as that of Hoel and Shapiro (2001). He introduces migration costs that represent imperfect 
household mobility. He finds that the introduction of imperfect household mobility and 
constant  policy  re-optimization  by  governments  leads  to  a  dynamic  tragedy  of  the 
commons,  where  the  externality  increases  as  household  mobility  increases.  There  is, 
however, a discontinuity between perfect and almost perfect household mobility. 
He emphasizes that the presence of shifting costs of migration implies that decisions to 
relocate  are  forward-looking:  people  do  not  migrate  because  they  think  they  will  be 
immediately  better  off  but  because  they  expect  a  better  future.  Similar  to  Hatton  and 
Williamson, he points out that rational governments re-optimize policy if permitted, and 
also that migration is a costly and gradual process. As migration costs approach zero, the 
economy becomes distorted as under global pollution. However, if migration costs are zero, 
the efficiency result in the literature is re-established. 
The cost of migration is modeled as an increasing function of the net migration to and 
from the source and destination countries. That is, the costs increase the more people that 
are currently migrating to that destination country, and the costs increase the more people 
are migration from the source country. 
The problem presented in the paper of Haavio (2003) is a differential game. In the 
socially optimal steady state, marginal utility of consumption equals the social marginal 
utility of environmental amenities. The non-cooperative game solution is suboptimal. The 
pollution stock has the strategic value of reducing immigration, which lowers its cost as 
perceived by an individual country. If a country implements socially optimal environmental 
policies, foreigners gradually migrate to that country and take their share of the cake. On 
the other hand, consuming now, rather than later, makes the country less attractive for 
foreigners.  Migration  costs  establish  instantaneous  private  access  on  the  benefit  side. 
Reduced migration costs accentuate the role of future access, and reinforce the strategic 




period model, where households are immobile in the first period, in the second period, 
households are perfectly mobile. This leads to the households consuming too much in the 
first period, before moving to equalized utility in the second period. 
Haavio  points  out  empirical  evidence  supporting  these  results  where  migration 
encourages people to disregard their environment such as mining communities, military 
bases, nomadic, and refugees. 
3. Key Issues to Consider in the Model 
This section is a summary of the points raised in the literature review which a model 
on environmental migration should consider. 
Research has pointed out the largest migrations will occur within countries rather than 
between countries. Hatton and Williamson point out that South-South migration has been 
largely ignored, but will become relatively more significant. Chichilinsky’s model, by having 
resource intensive sectors in southern developing countries, different technologies between 
regions, input prices local to each region, but global prices for produced goods, focuses 
however on international or cross border migration. 
One reason why South-North migration is less likely to occur is because governments 
in developed countries receiving South-North migration are able to ‘optimize’ policy, i.e., 
place quotas or costs on migration. This leads to an important question raised by Hatton 
and Williamson that is beyond the scope of the models: how  do  sovereign regions that 
endogenously  re-optimize  immigration  policy  affect  migration  and  the  extraction  of  an 
environmental resource? 
This  paper  develops  a  framework,  a  simplification  of  Chichilnisky  (1995)  and 
Chichilnisky  &  di  Matteo  (1998)  model,  from  which  the  following  questions  can  be 




1.  How do environmental refugees differ from environmental migrants? Is the distinction 
provided by Myers between “pulled by opportunity for a better economic life” and those 
“pushed by environmental destitution” a useful one? 
2.  How does environmental shock cause migration? 
Some additional points which are considered in the models are: 
1.  How to model migration when it is caused by factors other than real wage differentials? 
2.  The literature differentiates between migration that is caused by environmental shock 
and gradual environmental degradation. 
3.  Hatton  and  Williamson  (2002)  suggest  that  a  “hump-shaped”  relationship  between 
wealth and amount of migration due to costs of migration. 
4. Model of Closed Economy 
There are two regions, urban      and rural     . The population resides either in the 
urban  region  or  in  the  rural.  The  total  population,      is  normalized  to  one,  hence 
  represents the proportion of people living in the rural region and 1     represents the 
proportion of people living in the urban region. 
There are two goods,   and  , whose prices are given by    and   , respectively. Good 
  is produced in the rural region while good   in the urban region. 
The  rural  region’s  production  is  characterized  by  a  ‘tragedy  of  the  commons’ 
production function,        
     , such that the total production of the rural region is given 
by     
     . The production function   ·  is assumed to be twice differentiable and strictly 
concave,    0     ∞.   is a constant representing a fixed amount of common resource such 
as farming land. 
The production function in the rural region exhibits constant returns to scale and is 
specified as       1     . The rate of return of production in the rural region is normalized 




Each inhabitant has inelastic labor supply function for the provision of one unit of 
labor in return for        
      in the rural region or a   good in the urban area. 
The  economy  is  closed  such  that  prices      and      vary  according  to  supply  and 
demand. Goods are freely traded between rural region and urban region. 
There are no firms as such – each inhabitant receives what he or she produces and can 
trade (part of) it for the other good. Inhabitants of rural and urban regions have the same 
Cobb-Douglas utility functions:    ,           . 
4.1. Optimal Allocation 
A  benevolent  social  planner  would  optimize  the  allocation  of     and  1      to  each 
region in the economy to maximize overall social welfare, in this case, for a representative 
individual with a Cobb-Douglas utility function: 
max
 
   ,           
 
where 
        
      
    1     
The optimal    is solved by the following equation 
  
1         1     
 
1    
 
where   is the elasticity of    
      with respect to  . 
4.2. Competitive Equilibrium 
Inhabitants  maximize  their  utility  constrained  by  the  production  function  for  the 
region in which the inhabitant resides. 
The  urban  inhabitant  maximizes  utility  based  on  the  budget  constraint  that  she 






     ,       
      
    
subject to 
                1       
The results of optimization above are demand functions per individual in the urban region. 
    
    1     
   




Similarly, the rural inhabitant maximizes her utility under the budget constraint. She 
uses the production technology   · , characterized by tragedy of the commons production 
function, which depends on the number of other inhabitants of the rural region: 
max
  
     ,       
      
    
subject to 




which brings to the individuals’ demand functions: 
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Markets clear such that total demand from the two regions equals total supply: 
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The model follows a repeating two-stage model as suggested by Chichilnisky (1995). In 
the first period prices stabilize given constant  . In the second stage inhabitants migrate 
according to the difference in utility. That is, inhabitants of the rural migrate to the urban if 
         ,  and  from  the  urban  to  the  rural  if             as  suggested  in  Hatton  and 
Williamson  (2002),  and  used  in  Hoel  and  Shapiro  (2003),  and  Haavio  (2005).  This 
treatment diverges from Chichilnisky’s model (1995) where differences in real wage are the 
sole determinant of the migration decision. The approach where utility is compared is more 
general in that the utility function can be extended to model other factors involved in the 
decision to migrate such as those suggested by Hatton and Williamson (2002) and Haavio 
(2005). However, in this model as it is without other factors entering into utility, utility 
translates into real wage. 
Migration is assumed to be costless at this point. As in Chichilnisky’s model (1995), the 
speed  and  magnitude  of  migration  is  not  calculated,  following  the  assertion  that  it  is  a 
complex process that does not occur instantaneously. It is assumed that prices adjust faster 
than migration occurs. Inhabitants do not consider the external effect of their decision to 
migrate has on production in the rural. 
Given     is  constant  in  the  first  period,  prices  stabilize  as  presented  above.  In  the 
second  phase,  the  inhabitants  migrate  to  equalize  utility.  The  model  is  in  equilibrium 
(prices and migration) when:          or it is equivalent to the condition below: 
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Migration occurs from rural to urban when good  -good   relative marginal utility, 
 
     ,  is  less  than  rural-urban  relative  population, 
 
     .  Prices  and  migration  are  in 
equilibrium when these two conditions are equal. 
Proposition  1  When  prices  are  in  equilibrium,  inhabitants  migrate  until  rural-urban  relative 
population are equal to relative marginal utility of goods produced, regardless of the value of the 
fixed amount of the common resources. 
The result looks unusual because the allocation is affected by neither the amount of the 
common environmental resource, nor the elasticity of   
 
   with respect to  . So any shock 
on   does not result in migration from rural to urban. The reason is that if production of 
 decreases following a decrease in  , it is accompanied by a corresponding increase in price 
of good  ,    relative to   . The paradox occurs due to the Cobb-Douglas utility function 
and constant returns to scale technology in the urban region. 
The resulting allocation of   is suboptimal because inhabitants in the rural do not 
consider the externality they cause for other rural region inhabitants. The severity of the 
tragedy is ‘limited’ because the population size is fixed. If new inhabitants arrive, that is,    
is now increased to   
 , per capita social welfare decreases because per capita production of 
  decreases because the      
 
         
 
   due to concavity while per capita production of   
remains constant. 
Social welfare decreases in both the optimal and competitive equilibrium cases as   
decreases. Migration from the rural to the urban will increase per capita social welfare while 
      , and decrease it thereafter. 
 




5. Model of Small Open Economy 
The first model is modified to consider a small open economy where global prices are 
determined  on  the  world  markets  and  the  two  regions  are  price  takers.  Otherwise, 
conditions are the same. 
5.1.  Optimal Allocation 
Goods   and   can be bought on the world market at prices    and   , respectively. An 
optimal solution is given by maximizing total budget of the two regions by allocating      1 
between the two regions. 
max
 
      
 
 
       1      
subject to   0       1 
The optimal value for   is given by: 
  
  
     
 
 
   






An interpretation of above equation is the ratio of marginal production of both goods with 
respect to   equals the ratio of their prices. Note that the marginal production of good   
with respect to   is 1. 
5.2. Competitive Equilibrium 
I assume trade balances, but the formalities of expressing a small open economy here 
are unnecessary, because we need just to assume that each individual buys as much of what 
he can afford constrained by what he has produced. 
An inhabitant of the urban region, for example, still has demand functions     
  and    
  , 
as specified previously, regardless of whether he buys goods   and   from the rural or on 




Importantly, the consumer takes    and    as given, and demand equals supply. Since 
prices  are given in this model, only one period is  necessary. In this period, inhabitants 
migrate from the rural region to the urban region while          , or from urban region to 
rural region while          , as in the previous model. This leads to an expression of the 








The interpretation is that inhabits migrate until the real wages,     
 
  in the rural 
region, and    in the urban region are equal. In this model, unlike in the closed economy 
model, inhabitants take into account productivity compared to the inhabitants in the other 
region, because prices no longer adapt to a reduction in supply. This allows the following: 
Proposition 2 In a small open economy, a negative shock on the environmental resource, or a 
negative shock on the relative price of goods, causes migration to the urban region, if migration was 
previously in equilibrium. 
In the competitive equilibrium inhabitants do not take into account the externality 
their presence in the rural region causes to others and thus the equilibrium is sub-optimal. 
This is seen by comparing the equilibrium condition of the optimal solution, to that of the 
competitive equilibrium. Similar to the first model, the extent of a tragedy of the commons 
is limited because population is constant and inhabitants are able to move from the rural to 
the urban to increase their utility once utility drops to below that of inhabitants in the 
urban. 
Social  welfare  decreases  in  both  the  optimal  and  competitive  equilibrium  cases  as 
common environmental resource decreases. Migration from the rural region to the urban 
region will increase per capita social welfare while       , and decrease it thereafter. 





6.1. General Discussions 
In  both  competitive  equilibriums,  inhabitants  of  the  rural  region  do  not  take  into 
account  the  externality  they  cause  on  other  inhabitants’  production,  thus  making  the 
allocation of   sub-optimal. Governments may consider taxes or other policy to motivate 
inhabitants  to  move  between  regions,  although  implementation  of  a  poll  tax  would  be 
unpopular. 
In  the  small  open  economy  model,  movement  of  inhabitants  from  rural  region  to 
urban region improves the welfare of the rural if the        but has no effect on welfare in 
the urban because, by assumption, 
   · 
     1. In this case, the regions are only linked through 
migration-prices do not change to represent scarcity supply of good   or   as they do in the 
closed economy model. 
Fluctuations in the relative world prices of    and    will also cause migration in the 
small open economy model. Similarly, shocks on common environmental resource will also 
cause  migration.  This  is  different  from  the  closed  economy  where  migration  does  not 
depend on common environmental resource. Additionally, due to the Cobb-Douglas utility 
function and the constant returns to scale production function in the urban region, the 
competitive equilibrium leads to a value for   which does not depend on other variables. 
Lastly, the models provide an alternative to Chichilnisky’s more complex model. Both 
models have ‘tragedy of the commons’ production functions in the subsistence sector of the 
economy. The two models presented in this essay introduce the potential for migration to 
occur due to factors other than real wage differentials because inhabitants compare utility, 
not just real wages to decide whether to migrate or not. 
Nonetheless,  because  of  the  simplification  of  the  models  presented  here,  there  are 
three  criticisms,  raised  by  Hatton  and  Williamson  (2002),  which  this  paper  does  not 




account  immigration  controls.  Secondly,  most  research  has  examined  the  labor  market 
performance of migrants, but has not verified the underlying model of migration by which 
the  performance  is  interpreted.  Thirdly,  traditional  assumptions  lead  to  the  Stolper-
Samuelson  condition  whereby  the  emigration  rate  is  strictly  decreasing  with  economic 
development in the source country. 
6.2. Problematic of Modeling the Environmental Resource 
The discussion about the effects of environment and migration highlights some of the 
difficulties of economic modeling with respect to environmental resources and amenities. 
There are many authors who assert that environmental scarcity leads to migration. All 
agree  that  people  interact  with  the  environment  in  extremely  complex  ways.  If  these 
interactions  are  understood,  they  can  be  modeled,  although  they  may  not  provide  a 
tractable  model.  Clearly  the  way  these  interactions  are  modeled  will  lead  to  different 
conclusions. This leads to the question how environment enters into a model. 
Typically the environmental resource is modeled in one of two ways. Firstly, as an 
input  factor  to  production,  e.g.  water  or  land,  in  production         , ,    such  as  in 
Chichilnisky’s model or the two models presented in this paper. The production function is 
increasing in  . Alternatively; it is a variable in the utility function that is affected by the 
amount of emissions from production as in the models of trans-boundary pollution, e.g., it 
refers to utility from air quality. So the utility function is denoted by    ,  , but damaged 
by  pollution  from  production.               ,  where      is  the  perfect  state  of  the 
environment and   ·  is the damage caused by emissions,  . In the latter case, governments 
and consumers take environmental amenities into account when maximizing policy and 
utility, respectively. 
With the intent to emphasize the complex nature of interaction with the environment 
and the difficulty in modeling it, the following are considerations for economic modeling of 




Firstly, if environment enters into utility, but is not related to production through it 
being an input factor, or it being damaged by emissions from production, then environment 
is a static exogenous variable in a decision rule to migrate. 
Secondly, according to Suhrke (1994), the environment has a multiplicative effect on 
the  migration.  This  could  be  modeled  either  in  utility  such  as     ,         or  in  the 
production  function     ,         where     is  labor,  or  in  both  utility  and  production 
functions.  However,  this  contradicts  the  assumption  that  environment  is  modeled  as  a 
separable  function  of  utility,  e.g.,     , ,        ,        ,  .  Separability  of     in  the 
utility function is in certain circumstances a useful property. 
Thirdly, it is well known that wealthier people are more interested in environmental 
quality.  This  suggests  a  utility  function  such  as     ,               ,  ,  where  the 
derivatives of     ,   with respect to its independent variables are 
   · 
     0, 
   · 
     0, and 
    · 
       0. 
Fourthly,  a  paradoxical  situation  arises  if  an  inhabitant’s  utility  function  models 
overcrowding as        , ,
 
  , where   is increasing in 
 
 . This would mean that living 
alone would give the greatest utility. A threshold or “hump-shaped” relationship is more 
defensible. 
Fifth, in the two models presented, if the environmental resource,   in the rural region 
were introduced into the utility function, it could only be a variable in the utility of an 
inhabitant of the rural region – there being no environmental resource in the urban region 
in the two models. This means that urban and rural inhabitants are different in some way, 
that  when  they  migrate  their  preferences  are  changed,  and  that  utilities  are  no  longer 
comparable in the same dimensions. 
Lastly, if a variable   were introduced in the urban utility function, then a comparison 
between     and     would represent the comparison of many underlying characteristics of 




This could be solved by separating the   into a set of variables. Otherwise, it is unlikely that 
it  captures  the  complex  interactions  between  inhabitant  and  environment  which  all 
literature on the subject of migration emphasizes. 
The point of the section is to highlight that modeling of environmental quality and 
environmental resources is fraught with complexities. Simplifying assumptions may give 
results that are contrary to reality because the natural processes are misunderstood, while 
the assumptions are made for tractability reasons. Thus, to answer the observations that 
human interaction with the environment is a complex process, an econometric study into 
the factors of environmental migration is warranted. 
6.3. Does the Concept of Environmental Refugees Differ from the Concept of 
Environmental Migration? 
The  qualitative  literature  on  environment  and  migration  discusses  extensively  the 
possible  distinction  between  environmental  refugees  and  migrants,  but  is  inconclusive. 
Refugees  are  ‘pushed’,  while  migrants  are  both  ‘pushed  and  pulled’;  migrants  face  a 
decision, it would seem. 
A change on environment, whether gradual degradation or a shock, modeled as      , 
an ex-post reduction of   causes a reduction in production per worker in the Rural region. 
In the first model, prices adjusted to reflect the increased scarcity of good  . While overall 
social  welfare  decreases,  migration  does  not  occur  if  the  model  was  previously  in 
equilibrium. In the second model, the decrease in production in the rural region, lowers the 
real wage in that region, thus motivating a migration to the urban region, if wages and 
prices were previously in equilibrium. 
From this scenario, it is not possible to differentiate, between a migrant and a refugee 
because the decision, even following a shock on   is a comparison between utility levels. A 




However,  if  migration  costs  are  introduced  into  the  model,  it  is  possible  to  see  a 
distinction between environmental migrants and environmental refugees. In this scenario, 
an inhabitant in the rural region compares his utility in the rural and in the urban. The cost 
of the migration,   is introduced into the budget constraint of the urban region inhabitant. 
This can be represented formally as: 
max
  
     ,   
subject to 
                   
while for the rural region inhabitant, there is no differences with the previous one: 
max
  
     ,   
subject to 




Obviously, the constraint in the optimization program for the rural region inhabitant is 
bigger than the constraint for the urban region inhabitant. 
As  inhabitants  have  homogenous  utility  functions  (but  different  constraints),  the 
equation  reduces  to       
 
           .  As  a  result  of  a  shock  on   ,  the  income  of  an 
inhabitant of the rural,      
 
   decreases to be less than the costs of migration,      
 
      . 
The result is that a rational worker, although possibly aware of decreasing income due 
to reduced environmental resource is forced to remain in the rural region when income 
does not cover the cost of migration and there is no access to credit through a banking 
system. A rural inhabitant, who in one period may have been a potential migrant to the 
urban, will become an environmental refugee if the wage drops below the cost of migration 
because  of  an  environmental  shock.  The  reduction  in  income  can  also  arise  due  to 




The cost of migration can be interpreted to include a number of factors such as risk 
under risk aversion. Migration may also involve a significant time span without income. 
Thus, it is possible to make the distinction between migrants and refugees based on those 
who can afford to migrate after a shock on  and those who cannot. If, however, migration is 
costless,  i.e.,      0,  it  is  difficult  to  argue  for  any  economic  distinction  based  on  these 
models between an environmental migrant and an environmental refugee, because ex-post 
environmental shock, if environment is not modeled in the utility function, the worker in 
the  rural  cannot  achieve  the  same  level  of  utility  so  migrates  due  to  the  ex-post  wage 
differential. 
This result is useful for governments and non-governmental organizations to classify 
people affected by environmental change. Such organizations can use such a distinction to 
determine recipients of aid such as micro-credit loans. However, providing credit to rural 
region inhabitants to cover the cost of migration to the urban region may be in conflict with 
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